Can delusions be understood linguistically?

Delusions are widely believed to reflect disturbed cognitive function, but the nature of this remains elusive. The “un-Cartesian” cognitive-linguistic hypothesis maintains (a) that there is no thought separate from language, that is, there is no distinct mental space removed from language where “thinking” takes place; and (b) that a somewhat broadened concept of grammar is responsible for bestowing meaning on propositions, and this among other things gives them their quality of being true or false. It is argued that a loss of propositional meaning explains why delusions are false, impossible and sometimes fantastic. A closely related abnormality, failure of linguistic embedding, can additionally account for why delusions are held with fixed conviction and are not adequately justified by the patient. The unCartesian linguistic approach to delusions has points of contact with Frith’s theory that inability to form meta-representations underlies a range of schizophrenic symptoms. It may also be relevant to the nature of the “second factor” in monothematic delusions in neurological disease. Finally, it can inform the current debate about whether or not delusions really are beliefs.